Memorandum Rahasia dalam UU KIP

UU KIP Pasal 17:

i. memorandum atau suratsurat antar Badan Publik atau intra Badan Publik, yang menurut sifatnya dirahasiakan kecuali atas putusan Komisi Informasi atau pengadilan;


"Memorandum yang dirahasiakan" adalah memorandum atau surat surat antar Badan Publik atau intra Badan Publik yang menurut sifatnya tidak disediakan untuk pihak selain Badan Publik yang sedang melakukan hubungan dengan Badan Publik dimaksud dan apabila dibuka dapat secara serius merugikan proses penyusunan kebijakan, yakni dapat:

1. mengurangi kebebasan, keberanian, dan kejujuran dalam pengajuan usul, komunikasi, atau pertukaran gagasan sehubungan dengan proses pengambilan keputusan;
2. menghambat kesuksesan kebijakan karena adanya pengungkapan secara prematur; 
3. mengganggu keberhasilan dalam suatu proses negosiasi yang akan atau sedang dilakukan.

Saya ada 2 pertanyaan:

(i) Apa maksud "...kecuali atas putusan Komisi Informasi atau pengadilan" dalam penggalan kalimat terakhir Pasal 17 i? Apabila semua pengecualian dalam Pasal 17 pada akhirnya harus tunduk pada uji konsekuensi dan uji kepentingan publik, mengapa hanya Pasal 17 i yang mendapat kata kata "...kecuali atas putusan...."?

(ii) Apakah ada semacam guideline untuk pengecualian ini? Sejauh manakah batasan "Frank and Candour" (kebebasan keberanian dan kejujuran) dalam penjelasan pasal 17 i 1? Beberapa yurisdiksi lain memberikan batasan "Frank and Candour" kepada level pemerintahan yang tinggi saja.  Sankey v Whitlam [1978] HCA 43; (1978) 142 CLR 1 (9 November 1978)  (High Court of Australia) adalah yurisprudensi utama dalam permasalahan ini:

39. One reason that is traditionally given for the protection of documents of this class it that proper decisions can be made at high levels of government only if there is complete freedom and candour in stating facts, tendering advice and exchanging views and opinions, and the possibility that documents might ultimately be published might affect the frankness and candour of those preparing them. Some judges now regard this reason as unconvincing, but I do not think it altogether unreal to suppose that in some matters at least communications between Ministers and servants of the Crown may be more frank and candid if those concerned believe that they are protected from disclosure. For instance, not all Crown servants can be expected to be made of such stern stuff that they would not be to some extent inhibited in furnishing a report on the suitability of one of their fellows for appointment to high office, if the report was likely to be read by the officer concerned. However this consideration does not justify the grant of a complete immunity from disclosure to documents of this kind. Another reason was suggested by Lord Reid in Conway v. Rimmer (1968) AC, at p 952 :

"To my mind the most important reason is that such disclosure would create or fan ill-formed or captious public or political criticism. The business of government is difficult enough as it is, and no government could contemplate with equanimity the inner workings of the government machine being exposed to the gaze of those ready to criticise without adequate knowledge of the background and perhaps with some axe to grind."

Of course, the object of the protection is to ensure the proper working of government, and not to protect Ministers and other servants of the Crown from criticism, however intemperate and unfairly based. Nevertheless, it is inherent in the nature of things that government at a high level cannot function without some degree of secrecy. No Minister, or senior public servant, could effectively discharge the responsibilities of his office if every document prepared to enable policies to be formulated was liable to be made public. The public interest therefore requires that some protection be afforded by the law to documents of that kind. It does not follow that all such documents should be absolutely protected from disclosure, irrespective of the subject matter with which they deal. (at p40)